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Abstract
How did the global framework for financing sustainable development 
evolve in the past ten years? We argue that its evolution is deeply 
connected to multilateral initiatives such as the Monterrey consensus, 
the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, the Sustainable Development Goals 
and the Paris Agreement on climate change. Therefore, the year 2015 
may be considered as a landmark. In this vein, we identified five key 
changes that affect the global framework for financing development 
worldwide, showing how traditional international cooperation 
mechanisms coexist with new ones. They are discussed in the following 
order: the evolution of global development agendas; systemic power 
relations and financial flows; the institutional entrepreneurship of 
emerging powers; the increased role of development banks; and 
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from official development aid (ODA) to international public finance. Under the United 
Nations auspices or not, middle-income countries started to play a bigger role in financing 
mechanisms. Likewise, some national development banks became more important and 
started to act more closely under the International Development Finance Club (IDFC) 
auspices. Brazil, Colombia and South Africa are mentioned as cases for future research.
Keywords: Development Banks; Public Finance; Sustainable Development; Middle-Income 
Countries.
Resumo
O quadro global de financiamento do desenvolvimento sustentável é profundamente 
conectado por iniciativas multilaterais como as do Consenso de Monterrey, a Agenda de 
Ação de Addis Abeba, os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável e o Acordo de Paris 
sobre mudança do clima. Assim, o ano de 2015 pode ser considerado como um referencial no 
tema. Neste sentido, o texto identifica cinco grandes mudanças que afetam o quadro global 
para o financiamento do desenvolvimento mundo afora, demonstrando como mecanismos 
tradicionais de cooperação internacional coexistem com mecanismos novos. Eles são 
discutidos na seguinte ordem: a evolução das agendas globais de desenvolvimento; relações 
sistêmicas de poder e fluxos financeiros; entrepreneurship institucional das potências 
emergentes e o papel crescente de bancos de desenvolvimento; e a evolução da assistência 
oficial ao desenvolvimento para os financiamentos internacionais públicos. Sob a égide das 
Nações Unidas ou não, países de renda média aumentaram o seu papel nos mecanismos 
de financiamento global. Além disso, bancos de desenvolvimento de países como Brasil, 
Colômbia e África do Sul tornaram-se mais relevantes e mais próximos atuando no âmbito 
do Clube Internacional de Financiadores do Desenvolvimento (IDFC).
Palavras-chave: Bancos de Desenvolvimento; Finanças Públicas; Desenvolvimento 
Sustentável; Países de Renda Média.
Introduction 
Since the 2002 Monterrey meeting, the global development agenda was 
profoundly reshaped. There were significant changes in the global agendas (Kannie 
and Biermann 2017; Biscop 2019; Khanna 2019) which are discussed below. 
Furthermore, the COVID-19 has brought new issues to the global development 
agenda, that calls for in depth research in the near future. From an institutional 
viewpoint, these changes were marked by international institutional bypasses 
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 3, 2020, p. 5-28
7Philippe Orliange; Ana Flávia Granja e Barros
(Prado and Trebilcock 2019), that is, “a bypass offers an alternative to the dominant 
institution. This means that public and private institutions can be operating side 
by side without one being a bypass of the other” (Prado, 2019). Moreover, the 
same concept may be useful for assessing BRICS countries’ agenda (Stuenkel 
2019) and the global framework for public finance for sustainable development 
(FSDR 2019; Chimhowu et al 2019). 
In this scenario, middle-income countries (MIC) (Saad Filho 2004; Gu et al 
2016) and development banks may be considered increasingly important actors 
(Ferraz et al 2013; Ferraz and Countinho 2019; Orliange 2020). However, initiatives 
for reaching the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) within the UN 2030 
Agenda and the Objectives of the Paris Agreement on climate change are still 
underfunded, from public and private, domestic and international perspectives 
(Kannie and Biermann 2017; Lee 2019; FSDR 2019; Chimhowu et al 2019; 
Guterrez 2019; Soares and Inoue 2020). In addition, each source of financing brings 
impacts to the others, and international public finance encompasses much more 
than official development assistance (ODA) (FSDR 2019). Providing ODA was 
and still is the mission of aid agencies. Providing public finance, making up for 
market failures, taking risks others will not take, is the mission of development 
banks (DB). However, domestic or regional development banks are not new 
actors (Ferraz et al 2013; Orliange 2020). Many of them have been operating for 
decades (and some even for centuries), but the new global framework for public 
finance for sustainable development referred to above gives them an increased 
relevance (Ferraz and Countinho 2019; Orliange 2020). In other words, there 
were tectonic changes in the framework of development financing in the past 
ten years.
This article aims at assessing agendas and institutions in order to answer 
the following question: how did the global framework for public financing for 
sustainable development evolve? Recently, the development agenda evolved from 
the 2000 United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the 2015 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Naturally, both of them are connected 
to the Action21 adopted in Rio in 1992, as well as to the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and United Nations (UN) 
broader debates. Taking the 2030 agenda (SDGs) as the starting point of this 
analysis, we discuss five key changes in the framework for public finance for 
sustainable development. The first one concerns the evolution of development 
agendas since 1992, while the second one corresponds to the systemic power 
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diffusion to Asia. The third change is the institutional entrepreneurship of 
emerging powers, thus contributing to the increased role of development banks 
as a fourth trend. The fifth relates to the international public finance framework 
as a result of the other previous changes. 
The evolution of global development agendas
From Monterrey to Addis Ababa, the agendas evolved significantly in terms 
of the UN traditional cleavage between developing and developed countries. 
Emerging economies or middle-income countries (regardless of the debates 
about the categories) can no longer be defined as those receiving development 
finance. They have become providers of development finance in the recent past. 
In other terms, China and India, despite not having a high human development 
index (HDI) have a demonstrated capacity to provide development finance. Brazil 
had also been in that position in the 2010s, even though its capacity has been 
severely reduced in recent years.
After the adoption of the 2000 Millennium Development Goals by the UN 
General Assembly (UNGA), the Monterrey 1st international conference on financing 
for development took place in March 2002. At that meeting, the international 
consensus on development was revisited. Inspired by a North-South viewpoint, 
the Monterrey declaration stated in its first paragraph that the aim was “to address 
the challenges of financing for development around the world, particularly in 
developing countries. Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic 
growth and promote sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive 
and equitable global economic system”. 
The Monterrey consensus, in paragraph 4, reaffirmed the central character 
of the traditional North-South paradigm: “Achieving the internationally agreed 
development goals, including those contained in the Millennium Declaration, 
demands a new partnership between developed and developing countries”. It was 
therefore logical in this context to stress that: “Official development assistance 
(ODA) plays an essential role as a complement to other sources of financing 
for development, especially in those countries with the least capacity to attract 
private direct investment” (paragraph 39).
This consensus also mentioned on several occasions the case of “countries in 
transition”, a by-word referring to countries of the former Soviet bloc that were 
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undergoing transition from centrally planned economies to market economy, 
in the decade following the fall of the Berlin wall.3Although the Monterrey 
consensus also stressed the particular case of least developed countries, of 
landlocked developing countries and small island developing states, it did 
not challenge the notion that the partnership to be approved was between 
“developed” and “developing” countries.
In this context, the year 2015 is a turning point in multilateral negotiations 
related to sustainable development under the United Nations auspices, when three 
fundamental conferences took place. However different4, they have contributed 
to changing the global framework for public finance worldwide. In July, the 
Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) agreed upon financing for development. 
In September, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Agenda 
2030 on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), in New York. In December, the 
Paris Agreement was adopted by the 21st conference of the parties (COP 21) to 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
These three multilateral initiatives brought about a different perspective 
from the cleavage between developed and developing countries, but it does 
not mean that the cleavage simply disappeared. It is still present in the Paris 
agreement (article 2) but balanced with the principle crafted in Rio in 1992 of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the 
light of different national circumstances”. The agreement has also recognized 
the needs of least developed countries (LDC) and small island developing states 
(SIDS) (Paris agreement, article 4, para 6). Agenda 2030 stresses the case for 
“the poorest and most vulnerable countries”.5 The AAAA also refers to the 
special needs of LDC, small islands developing states and, on several occasions, 
to African states (AAAA, paragraph 8). 
3 The complexity stemming from different development challenges around the world was somehow updated. 
See, for instance, Monterrey Consensus, paragraph 20 “A central challenge, therefore, is to create the necessary 
domestic and international conditions to facilitate direct investment flows, conducive to achieving national 
development priorities, to developing countries, particularly Africa, least developed countries, small island 
developing States, and landlocked developing countries, and also to countries with economies in transition”.
4 The three conferences had their own negotiating tracks but their respective outcomes, in spite of different 
legal status, are remarkably convergent and consistent. They are part of the same systemic efforts in our view.
5 In the Preamble of the UNGA resolution it was stated in the following manner: “We are determined to mobilize 
the means required to implement this Agenda through a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable 
Development, based on a spirit of strengthened global solidarity, focused in particular on the needs of the 
poorest and most vulnerable and with the participation of all countries, all stakeholders and all people”.
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The AAAA offers a broader picture when it comes to international financing. 
“International public finance plays an important role in complementing the 
efforts of countries to mobilize public resources domestically, in particular in 
the poorest and most vulnerable countries with limited domestic resources. Our 
ambitious agenda puts significant demands on public budgets and capacities, 
which requires scaled-up and more effective international support, including 
both concessional and non-concessional financing” (AAAA, paragraph 50). 
Therefore, it referred to establishing an “enhanced and revitalized partnership 
for sustainable development” (AAAA, paragraph 10). Besides, it stated that “This 
global partnership should reflect the fact that the post-2015 development agenda, 
including the sustainable development goals, is global in nature and universally 
applicable to all countries while taking into account different national realities, 
capacities, needs and levels of development and respecting national policies and 
priorities” (AAAA, paragraph 10).
The global nature of the AAAA echoes the Sustainable Development Goals 
themselves: “The 17 Sustainable Development Goals and 169 targets which we 
are announcing today demonstrate the scale and ambition of this new universal 
Agenda (…). They are integrated and indivisible and balance the three dimensions 
of sustainable development: the economic, social and environmental” (Preamble 
of Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 25 September 2015). It is 
equally consistent with the goals and objectives of the Paris agreement that 
acknowledges that “climate change is a common concern of humankind” (Preamble 
of the Paris agreement). It also stresses that the Agreement aims “to strengthen 
the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable 
development and efforts to eradicate poverty…”. (Article 2 of the 2015 Paris 
Agreement). In sum, the need to strengthen the global development initiatives 
and the financial safety net still is a key challenge for humankind, notably after 
the COVID-19 crisis.
Systemic power relations and financial flows
After the failure of the Washington consensus (Bresser Pereira 2011), there 
are at least three systemic megatrends in international relations: the decline of 
the US leadership, the power shift to Asia, and the growing role of the private 
sector (Allison 2018; Khanna 2019; Biscop 2019). As a result, the rich traditional 
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providers for official development assistance had to cope with numerous middle-
income countries’ increasing interests (Inoue and Vaz 2012; Narlikar 2013; FSDR 
2019) and bigger development banks, including the International Development 
Finance Club (IDFC) discussed below.
Although non-traditional creditors became more relevant, the most important 
public actors are still development agencies, whose primary function is to provide 
official development assistance. Although ODA from OECD/Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) countries stood at 146,6 billion USD in 2017, the flow is still 
traditionally North-South driven. Actually, there are at least three competing 
poles of financing for development: the United States, the Europeans6 and China. 
However, other flows of international public finance are coming from the South, 
notably the middle-income countries. Hence, we assume financing flows follow 
the systemic changes in terms of power relations. In other words, emerging 
economies play a more important role in financing for development (OECD 2019).
Combined with the crisis in the UN-led multilateral commitments7, the three 
megatrends above shaped the current global framework for public finance for 
sustainable development. Despite the fact that the role of the private sector is 
growing, as blended financing strategies show (Voituriez et al 2017; Soares and 
Inoue 2020), this article focuses exclusively on public financing.
The institutional entrepreneurship of emerging powers 
Emerging powers are economic powers seeking for more recognition in 
multilateral arenas (Narlikar 2013). Because they still have to face serious social 
challenges, they are still middle-income countries (Morin and Orsini 2020). 
Nowadays, the majority of the “developing world” is middle-income countries, 
that is, 94 out of 130 countries. They are aid receivers but also providers of 
international public finance (Inoue and Vaz 2012; Baumann 2017; Farias 2018; 
FSDR2019; Chimhowu et al 2019), operating through cooperation agencies and 
6 Some European countries have important development agencies, eight of them joined the IDFC (retrieved 
from idsc.org/members) and twenty-three joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (retrieved from 
https://www.aiib.org/en/about-aiib/governance/members-of-bank/index.html). June 06, 2020.
7 Multilateralism crises under the UN auspices are not a recent trend. Reports from Secretary-Generals since 
Kofi Annan, for instance, mention some traces of crises in different issues. See the Guterrez 2019 Report for 
an update. In May 2020, the World Health Organization became the epicenter of a new crisis as President 
Donald Trump decided to leave the organization.
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development banks. Hence, the UN recent negotiations and agendas are also a 
result of their empowerment.
Agenda 2030 makes a short reference to MICs:
“Each country faces specific challenges in its pursuit of sustainable 
development. The most vulnerable countries and, in particular, African 
countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries 
and small island developing States, deserve special attention, as do 
countries in situations of conflict and post-conflict. There are also serious 
challenges within many middle-income countries” (Paragraph 27 of the 
SDG summit, New York, 25-27 September 2015). The 2030 Agenda, when 
referring to objectives and indicators, also recognizes the particular case 
of middle-income countries8.
Compared with the Monterrey Consensus, the newest feature in the AAAA9, 
is the explicit mention of middle-income countries’ needs, which were not 
mentioned at all in the Monterrey text. References to the special needs of MICs 
were made on several occasions, such as: in general terms (paragraph 8); in the 
context of foreign direct investment (para. 46); as a group facing “significant 
challenges to achieve sustainable development” (para. 71 and 72). So, this 
explicit reference to MICs is quite new and signals a particular and growing 
concern of this particular group of countries.
The changes brought about by the new framework will be analyzed globally 
and also through the example of three middle income countries, whose track 
record in the area of international public finance is significant for a variety of 
reasons. Mainstream literature focuses primarily on China and India, but our 
analysis focuses on Brazil, South Africa and Colombia. They are receivers of 
official development assistance but also of other flows of development finance. 
Additionally, they play an important role in the framework, although 2021 may 
bring a new scenario.
8 See in particular paragraph 48 “Indicators are being developed to assist this work. Quality, accessible, timely 
and reliable disaggregated data will be needed to help with the measurement of progress and to ensure that 
no one is left behind. Such data is key to decision-making. Data and information from existing reporting 
mechanisms should be used where possible. We agree to intensify our efforts to strengthen statistical capacities 
in developing countries, particularly African countries, least developed countries, landlocked developing 
countries, small island developing States and middle-income countries. We are committed to developing 
broader measures of progress to complement gross domestic product”. Available at: <https://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/1&Lang=E>. Access on 10 Nov 2020.
9 Also, the AAAA no longer mentions the case of « countries in transition ».
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Brazil and South Africa have been active in the field of development 
cooperation for quite some time (Chatuverdi et al. 2012; Inoue and Vaz, 2012). 
Colombia is a newcomer but it has played a very significant role in the elaboration 
and adoption of the SDGs. Also, it joined the OECD in 2020. Brazil and South 
Africa, as BRICS members participated in the creation of the New Development 
Bank (NDB) in 2014, headquartered in Shanghai, with branches in Johannesburg 
and São Paulo. While Colombia and Brazil have a cooperation agency, South 
Africa is still working towards the creation of its agency. The three countries 
have development banks – Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e 
Social (BNDES) for Brazil, Banco de Comercio Exterior de Colombia (Bancoldex), 
Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA).
Concisely, the complexity of institutional entrepreneurship of MICs is still 
largely unexplored. Most IR analysts put the debate in terms of integration or 
competition (Ikenberry, 2011; Prantl, 2014; Stuenkel 2019). However, there is a 
growing probability of more collaboration among them, within the International 
Development Finance Club (IDFC), for instance. The IDFC was established in 
2010 with 23 development banks, out of which only three were from OECD/DAC 
countries (JICA from Japan, KFW from Germany, AFD from France). Others 
were from developing and emerging countries. The IDFC members represented 
in 2019 a total of asset worth 3 trillion USD and annual commitments of 405 
billion, out of which green finance alone represents 98 billion (IDFC, 2019). In 
2020, the IDFC has 26 members, 600 billion USD in commitments and the asset 
raised to 4 trillion dollars (IDFC, 2020)10. 
The increased role of development banks
The follow-up report to the AAAA, prepared by the United Nations Department 
for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) analyzed the role of national 
development banks and pointed at their contribution to financing the transition 
to sustainable infrastructure (UN 2017,15-16). The International Development 
Finance Club also made the case for the increased role of development banks in 
the financing of Agenda 2030. The creation of the IDFC in 2010, at the initiative 
of CAF, BNDES and KFW’s CEOs, aimed at helping “national and sub-regional 
10 There are 8 members from Europe, 4 from Africa, 6 from Asia and the Middle East and 8 from Central, South 
America and the Caribbean Region. Retrieved from: https://www.idfc.org/members/. Access on 5 Jun 2020.
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development banks strengthen their voice in an environment dominated by 
multilateral financing institutions” (IDFC 2019). The objectives are described as 
follows: “Agenda setting by joining forces and networking on issues of similar 
interest, I dentifying and developing joint business opportunities, sharing know-
how and best practice experiences for mutual learning”. Issues of common interest 
for the members are: “climate finance, infrastructure finance, social development, 
poverty reduction, green banking and innovation finance” (IDFC 2019). In 2020, 
the IDFC took action to help fight the COVID-19 pandemic11.
The membership of the IDFC illustrates the global and universal partnership 
mentioned in the AAAA and departs from the old North-South logic. Only three 
members were from “donor countries”: KFW, AFD, JICA, and the majority is 
from middle-income countries, with an unprecedented representation of Latin 
America. Development banks are not “new actors” because many of them existed 
even before ODA was created. But the new international agenda for development 
financing is reshaping their role and they are shaping this new agenda in return. 
With the increasing focus put on international public finance, the AAAA 
also stresses the role of development banks, a category of actors that was barely 
mentioned in the Monterrey Consensus. This is the case in paragraph 33 that 
“notes the role that well-functioning national and regional development bank 
can play in financing sustainable development, particularly in credit market 
segments in which commercial banks are not fully engaged and where large 
financing gaps exist (…)”. The text also stresses the counter-cyclical role that such 
banks can play. These references are made in the section devoted to “domestic 
resources mobilization”. Development banks are also referred to in the section 
dealing with international development cooperation, alongside multilateral 
development banks (AAAA, paragraph 70), or on their own AAAA, paragraph 75). 
Development banks, as diverse as they may be, provide long-term public finance 
for development. 
From ODA to International public finance 
Several factors explain the creation in the early 1960s of a body of policies, 
mechanisms and institutions aiming at defining international development 
cooperation and official development assistance (ODA). Development economics 
11 <https://www.idfc.org/idfc-response-to-covid-19-crisis/>. Access on 10 Nov 2020.
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argued that underdevelopment was the result of insufficient investment, which 
in itself is the consequence of insufficient domestic savings. Hence, the need 
to supply from outside was clear. Others argued on moral grounds that rich 
countries should not ignore the sufferings of poor ones and should therefore find 
ways to help them and their people. Of course, geopolitics was not absent from 
the debate concerning establishing ODA as a permanent feature of inter-state 
relations. Put bluntly, financial assistance soon appeared as a path for world 
powers to strengthen alliances (or create new ones).
In this context, Monterrey and Addis Ababa have both stressed the importance 
of mobilizing domestic resources when it comes to financing sustainable 
development. Monterrey was a landmark in this respect since prior to 2002 the 
issue of domestic resource mobilization did not receive the same level of attention 
it did on the first conference on financing for development. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned above, ODA came first in the list of tools aimed at supporting the 
global partnership at Monterrey. Thirteen years later, Addis Ababa Action Agenda 
started its section C on “International development cooperation” stressing the 
role of “international public finance”. Likewise, Agenda 2030 also referred to 
international public finance as a complement to domestic public resources12. 
Chapter 3 of the Financing for Sustainable Development Report (FSDR, 2019) is 
thus entitled “International Development Cooperation”.
All the above arguments made the case for transferring resources, closely in 
line with the Marshall Plan in postwar Europe. It is remarkable that the institution 
that was established to coordinate and follow the implementation of this Plan, the 
Organization for European Economic Cooperation, became the Organization for 
Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD). In its framework, the committee 
in charge of defining and monitoring the newly “official development assistance” 
was established. Therefore, the notion of ODA and how it was monitored had 
several implications from postwar experiences. 
It was first necessary to agree on a common definition of ODA, so that it 
could be clearly distinguished from export-credits. The focus of the nascent ODA 
12 Paragraph 43 states “We emphasize that international public finance plays an important role in complementing 
the efforts of countries to mobilize public resources domestically, especially in the poorest and most vulnerable 
countries with limited domestic resources. An important use of international public finance, including official 
development assistance (ODA), is to catalyze additional resource mobilization from other sources, public and 
private. ODA providers reaffirm their respective commitments, including the commitment by many developed 
countries to achieve the target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income for official development assistance 
(ODA/GNI) to developing countries and 0.15 per cent to 0.2 per cent of ODA/GNI to least developed countries”.
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was to stir growth and development that would eventually increase income. 
A target was set: 0,7%13 of rich countries GDP was due to be allocated to ODA 
under the UN framework. At this point it is worth noting that the 0,7% target is 
a rare case of a regionally defined concept receiving international recognition. 
There is no universal definition of ODA (it is an OECD concept which has been 
given recognition by the UN) but there is no universal support for the 0,7% 
target. Second, a consensus on which countries should be eligible to receive 
ODA was reached. The notion of a list of beneficiaries was based on a level of 
per capita income above which a country was no longer eligible to access ODA 
funds. The OECD was not the only institution to draw up lists of countries. The 
World Bank established a similar system. So did the United Nations with a list 
of “Least developed countries” (LDC), although LDC are not necessarily poor 
countries in per capita income terms. Third, the definition of modalities for 
reporting on aid flows was a task for donor countries.
The overall levels of ODA remained more or less stable (at relatively high 
levels) until the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 1989 (thus showing in retrospect that 
geopolitical motives had weighed more strongly in favor of ODA than what had 
been publicly acknowledged). Then, ODA started to decline until the adoption 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) gave a new life to the twin agenda 
of combatting poverty and increasing ODA. The G7 countries had also made 
the case in favor of helping the poorest countries with the Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) initiative, launched by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, and supported by the 1999 G7 summit. Other factors such as the 
creation of the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United 
Kingdom gave centrality to the issue of poverty in the international agenda. 
The Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development further endorsed this 
renewed commitment. So, at the beginning of the 21st century, ODA as a way to 
support the poverty eradication agendas in developing countries was enjoying 
a much stronger support than had been the case since the late 1980s. Recently, 
ODA augmented, but it was concentrated in a few countries and related to 
humanitarian emergencies (FSDR, 2019:77).
Nevertheless, ODA is not the only source of public external finance that flows 
into developing and emerging countries. The Table 1 below shows the respective 
13 An estimate was made of the external resources needed in developing countries to make up for the lack of 
savings needed to finance investment levels needed to achieve the expected targeted growth. This amount 
was equivalent to 0,7%.
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size of different financial flows to and in developing countries, both domestic 
and international, public and private, and their allocation by income category.
















LICs/LDCs 51 2 37 136% 105 48%
LMICs 45 29 100 45% 748 6%
UMICs 22 34 366 6% 2301 1%
Total 118* 65* 508 23% 3155 4%
* The figure is lower than the total gross ODA or OOF since a portion of ODA and OOF cannot be allocated to specific 
countries or income categories
** AFD figures based on OECD, WB and IMF data.
Source: AFD, OECD, WB and IMF data.
“Other official financial flows” (OOF), include public finance for development 
purposes but which are not on concessional terms as ODA is. The fact that there 
is no internationally agreed upon target for OOF, comparable to the 0,7% of GDP 
for ODA, explains why it is not as widely known as ODA is in the framework of 
international negotiations on development finance. The quality of the reporting 
is often lower than ODA reporting and may result in the underestimation of 
these flows. They include export credits, financing provided by public financial 
institutions in the forms of loans, either to public or private counterparts, on 
concessional terms, etc. Since 2017, exports credits that used to be included in 
OOF are accounted for separately.
Similar to ODA, OOF are public flows from developed countries to developing 
ones, but the notion of international public finance goes beyond that14. Section C of 
the AAAA mentions “South-South Cooperation” under the heading “international 
development cooperation”. Is South-South Cooperation “international public 
finance”? This is not clearly stated in the document, which characterizes South-
South Cooperation in terms of “shared experiences and objectives” rather than 
in terms of financial flows (AAAA, paragraphs 56 and 57). 
The AAAA also refers to a possible new concept that comes close to a 
description of “international public finance”, namely the “proposed total official 
support for sustainable development” (TOSSD) (AAAA, paragraphs 55). TOSSD is 
14 For a more comprehensive analysis of the key concepts related to development financing, see Farias (2018).
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an effort by the OECD to account for the financial flows that support sustainable 
development but which are not ODA, either because they do not match the 
financial standards of ODA or because they are provided by non-OECD member 
states. As Mr. Jorge Moreira, director for development cooperation of OECD put 
it recently; there is a need to “provide the first-ever global picture of finance for 
development from all donors. Initial estimates show that this could be upwards 
of USD 500-600 billion annually. This new standard will allow for transparency, 
accountability and comparability that will strengthen collective multilateral 
development finance and decision-making. At the same time, ODA will remain 
distinct in its policy standard-setting and its target-setting measurement of 0.7% 
ODA/GNI for foreign aid spending” (Moreira and Gornitzka 2018).
Middle-income countries and the new development agenda
Based on DAC methodology, among the 146 countries listed as ODA recipients, 
in 2016, 94 are middle income (lower and upper) and 52 are least developed 
countries (LDC) or Low Income, meaning that two thirds of the “developing 
world” are middle-income countries. It is of political significance the fact that 
the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and Agenda 2030 contain explicit references 
to middle-income countries, even though they do not constitute an established 
category, within the UN system, the way least developed countries do.
The relevance of the new development agenda and in particular the issue 
of financing for development (and climate) for middle income countries will be 
analyzed in general terms and through the examples of three countries: Brazil, 
South Africa and Colombia. From an “OECD/DAC” point of view, Brazil, South 
Africa and Colombia are recipient of overseas development assistance. Table 2 
below shows how they were positioned in the recent past.
Table 2. ODA received in 2016 (in million USD)
South Africa Brazil Colombia
Total ODA 1315 880 1167
Of which OECD/DAC countries 1098 755 1037
Source: OECD StatExport 2017.
Middle-income countries in general have actively participated in the elaboration 
of the process leading to the adoption of the SDGs. The role of Colombia in this 
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process has often been emphasized (Chataigner and Tous 2017). Contrary to the 
MDGs process which was largely inspired by the works of development agencies, 
the SDGs process has really been universal and with a much stronger input from 
middle income countries. As a result, the 17 SDGs cover a much broader scope 
of issues than the MDGs in which issues relating to social services (education, 
health, water and sanitation) were given “the lion’s share”. Issues such as 
inequalities (SDG 10) or sustainable cities (SDG 11) are of particular relevance 
for middle-income countries having reached or being in the process of reaching 
high level of urbanization, a growing middle class, and so on.
As mentioned above, the AAAA makes special reference to issues of 
importance for middle-income countries. The document signals that MICs “still 
face significant challenges to achieve sustainable development” (para. 71), that 
“ODA and concessional finance is still important for a number of these countries” 
(id.). It calls for “methodologies to better account for the (…)realities of MICs” 
(para. 72), raises the issue of “graduation” and calls for “gradual policies” in 
this regard (id).
In addition to these issues, certain categories of actors highlighted in the 
AAAA are of particular relevance for middle income countries. This is the case with 
development banks, for instance. It is also the case with the issue of sub-sovereign 
lending15. Development banks are not a prerogative of middle-income countries. 
Many developed countries do have such instruments. However, it is of particular 
relevance for them given the nature of financing needs of middle-income countries. 
Even though the Paris agreement as such does not make explicit reference 
to middle-income countries, they are already key players in the area of climate 
finance. A number of MICs are already large emitters of greenhouse gases. During 
the Paris talks, Brazil and South Africa ranked 11th and 17th in the list of major 
emitters (UNFCCC16). The provisions of the Paris agreement on finance might look 
weak, but they are consistent with what MICs may need: “this agreement aims 
to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change (…) including 
by making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse 
gas emissions and climate-resilient development” (Paris Agreement, article 2C). 
Finance flows in this context are not linked to a level of income that would place 
15 Development banks are often mentioned in the AAAA. See for instance paragraphs 33,43,70,75, 81. Lending 
for sub-nationals is mentioned in paragraph 34.
16 The website has an official map of emitters. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/transparency-and-
reporting/greenhouse-gas-data/ghg-data-unfccc/ghg-data-from-unfccc>.
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a constraint for middle-income countries. They are associated with a “pathway 
towards climate resilient development”. This is exactly what the SDGs and the 
AAAA are about. Likewise, the OECD/DAC recognizes the nexus humanitarian 
aid-development-peace17.
Middle-income countries are also providers of development finance (Chaturvedi 
et al, 2012; Guet al, 2016). It is interesting to analyze their practices against the 
background of the new development agenda. However, the issue of availability of 
data must be mentioned. Outside OECD/DAC, there are no harmonized practices 
for reporting on development finance. The OECD publishes information about 
non-DAC countries. Some do report figures about their ODA using DAC standards. 
This is the case with Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Russia, and 
Thailand. None of the three countries of interest does report to the OECD. 
However, OECD occasionally publishes estimates based on data published by 
the countries themselves.
Table 3. Estimates of gross concessional flows for development cooperation 2011-2015 
(USD million, current)
Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Source
Brazil 469 411 316 - -
Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA) 
and Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC)
China (PR of) 2785 3123 2997 3401 3113 Fiscal Yearbook, Ministry of Finance
Colombia 22 27 42 45 42
Strategic institutional plans, Presidential 
Agency of International Cooperation
India 794 1077 1223 1398 1772 Annual budget figures, Ministry of Finance
Indonesia 16 26 49 56 - Ministry of National Development Planning
Mexico 99 203 526 169 -
Mexican Agency for International 
Development Cooperation (AMEXCID)
South Africa 229 191 191 148 100
Estimates of public expenditures, 
National Treasury
Source: Own elaboration (2020)
OECD also publishes data regarding flows of concessional resources 
going through international institutions to which middle income countries are 
contributors, using the coefficient that qualifies the amount of these contributions 
counted as ODA.
17 The World Bank Group (www.worldbank.org), United Nations Development Program (www.undp.org) and 
the OECD share the same view on this nexus.
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Table 4. Estimated contributions of middle-income countries to international 




Colombia India Indonesia Mexico
South 
Africa
Total Total Total Total Total Total Total
Total United Nations 54,3 206,6 13,2 59,3 14,2 50,0 18,7
UN (18%) 14,3 25,1 1,3 3,3 1,7 9,0 1,8
FAO (51%) 8,7 18,8 5,4 2,0 1,1 13,7 2,5
UNESCO (60%) 6,0 18,5 0,0 5,0 1,0 5,9 1,1
WHO (76%) 1,9 24,9 0,1 9,1 2,2 6,5 1,9
UNDPKO (7%) 0,7 38,8 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,4 0,1
WFP (100%) 7,2 10,5 1,4 1,4 - - -
IFAD (100%) - 7,0 0,2 13,0 3,6 1,7 -
ILO (60%) 8,0 15,2 0,0 2,0 1,0 0,2 2,3
UNIDO (100%) - 13,9 0,3 6,7 0,5 0,3 0,5
IAEA (33%) - 10,5 0,1 1,5 0,8 3,5 1,1
UNDP (100%) 0,5 8,1 3,8 9,7 0,8 2,0 2,6
Other United Nations Agencies 6,9 15,4 0,5 5,5 1,4 6,7 4,6
Total regional devpt banks 41,6 21,3 17,7 41,8 - 36,0 26,9
IaDB (100%) 41,6 - 11,4 - - 26,8 -
AfDB (100%) - 9,6 - 34,4 - - 26,9
IsDB (100%) - 10,0 - - - - -
CABEI (100%) - - 5,4 - - - -
AsDB (100%) - - - 7,5 - - -
CaDB (100%) - 1,8 0,9 - - 9,2 -
World Bank Group (total) - - - 65,5 - - 12,3
Other multilateral organisations - 5,0 - 21,7 - - 22,9
African Union (100%) - - - - - - 15,6
Global Environment Facility (100%) - - - 2,9 - - -
The Global Fund (100%) - 5,0 - 4,3 - - -
Southern African Development 
Community (100%)
- - - - - - 4,0
Other organisations - - - 14,6 - - 3,4
Overall total 95,9 232,9 30,9 188,3 14,2 86,0 80,8
Source: Benn and Luijkx (2017). 
Other estimates provide very different figures. For Brazil, Suyama et al (2016, 39) 
show expenditures reaching 900 million USD in 2011, with peacekeeping operations 
representing 250 million USD and contributions to international organizations 
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300 million USD, way above OECD estimates. Because methodologies are not 
clearly stated, comparison with “traditional” donors are difficult. However, if 
OECD sources are used, in 2013 these three countries have provided the following 
amounts of concessional finance to developing countries, either bilaterally or 
through international organizations.
Table 5. Concessional finance to developing countries, from South Africa,  
Brazil and Colombia, based on OECD estimates, in million USD
Bilateral Multilateral Total
South Africa 191 80 271
Brazil 316 95 411
Colombia 42 30,9 72,9
Source: Benn and Luijkx (2017).
The three countries under analysis have established development agencies, 
which channel or implement part or most of the bilateral funding listed above 
(Agência Brasileira de Desenvolvimento (ABC) in the case of Brazil, South 
African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA)18 in South Africa, and Agencia 
Presidencial de Cooperación Internacional de Colombia, (APC) for Colombia. 
However, they have development banks that play a role in international public 
finance: BNDES, BANCOLDEX, DBSA. To assess the impact of development banks 
on international public finance, we considered the disbursements and the part 
of these disbursements related to activities abroad (which can be export finance 
of financing for projects). Based on these criteria, the following figures can be 
extracted from the annual reports of the banks:
Table 6. Annual disbursements of BNDES, Bancoldex and DBSA  
related to international activities
Bancoldex BNDES DBSA
Annual disbursements
(converted in million USD)
1,600 22,000 0,891
Of which, international activities 0,450 4,000 0,222
Type of activities Exports Exports
Development financing 
in 14 countries
Source: Based on information contained in annual reports by Bancoldex, BNDES and DBSA, 2015-2016.
18 SADPA is still in the process of being formally established. South Africa has been implementing development 
cooperation through its “Africa Renaissance Fund”, under the Department of International relations and 
cooperation (DIRCO).
Rev. Carta Inter., Belo Horizonte, v. 15, n. 3, 2020, p. 5-28
23Philippe Orliange; Ana Flávia Granja e Barros
Exports credits are not considered under OECD rules as development financing. 
Some may therefore object to considering a bank providing export finance as 
a “development financier”. However, it is worth noting that the definition of 
“climate finance” used to follow up on the commitment made in Copenhagen in 
2009 about the 100 bn USD target of climate finance for development countries 
includes export finance. Seen from a “micro” perspective, it is better in terms 
of combatting climate change to use export finance of wind or solar plants than 
to use ODA to finance a coal-powered thermal plant.
Strangely enough, the current literature dealing with South-South cooperation 
seldom focusses on the role of these banks as providers of international public 
finance. It focusses more on the role of agencies when the sheer numbers would 
suggest doing otherwise. 
Final Remarks
Since the 1992 Rio Summit, the global landscape changed considerably. 
Likewise, different ambitious and global agendas set the decades’ priorities 
related to development, notably in 2015. The Monterrey meeting, the Addis Ababa 
Action Agenda, the United Nations Agendas (setting Millennium Development 
and Sustainable Development Goals) and the climate COP 21, all together, 
emphasize the need for public policies consistent with the new global challenges. 
They encompass ensuring properly functioning institutions, providing public 
services, making up for what the private cannot or does not want to finance. 
As a result, public policies require public finance and more private financing 
mechanisms and investment. This complex interaction is captured by the concept 
of institutional bypass. In this context, public development banks are the only 
category of public actors, apart from the states themselves, having the capacity to 
make the numbers match the targets set at the global conferences and agendas. 
Five key changes affected the evolution of the global financing framework 
for sustainable development. First, the evolution of development agendas was 
remarkable, notably under the UN auspices, although the results are still generally 
poor as Guterrez stated in 2019. Not only did the multilateral agendas offer a 
broader view global challenges and their interconnections, but also they adopted 
a more sophisticated approach to viable solutions, opening windows for other 
financing options. From the 1992 Rio Summit to the 2015 Paris Agreement on 
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climate change, public and private actors augmented their interactions in the 
financing of development efforts. In addition, the simple distinction between 
developed and developing countries was challenged by theses agendas. These 
agendas also recognized other types of countries with specific needs, such as small 
islands developing states, least developed countries and emerging economies.
Second, the systemic power relations changed, that is, the power shift to 
Asia and some middle-income countries. Most recent literature focus on China 
and the South-East Asia, emphasizing the role new institutions such as the New 
Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank tend to play 
in the future. However, countries like Brazil, Colombia and South Africa also 
play an important role in the framework. Besides having regional importance, 
they participated in the creation of the International Development Finance Club.
Third, we mentioned emerging countries and their institutional entrepreneurship, 
mainly connected to the South-South cooperation efforts. Brazil, Colombia and 
South Africa are examples of countries that invested heavily in the financing of 
development projects. Because some of them experimented recent and impressive 
economic growth rates up to 2015, but declined afterwards, it is important to 
follow their respective roles in the post-COVID-19 scenario.
Fourth, the empowerment of development banks and the creation of their 
own international club, the IDFC. Because development banks share the same 
objectives and financing for development, planning to finance global goals is an 
opportunity to shape their respective priorities. Although the IDFC is still little 
explored in IR literature, we tried to highlight its mounting importance. The 
conditions under which it functions and how policy networks inside member 
countries may influence its success need to be analyzed in depth in the future.
Fifth, the international public financing mechanisms that resulted from 
the previous changes lead to the conclusion that the framework for financing 
development changed significantly. The SDGs definitely also contributed to 
blurring the distinction between developed and developing countries. Confronted 
with the challenge of SDGs all countries are “developing”, since they all have a 
social agenda to manage. The 2030 Agenda also dilutes the distinction between 
what is domestic and what is international. For example, the implementation of 
domestic policies aimed at reducing GHG emissions in all countries is key for the 
success of international cooperation to tackle climate change and health issues. 
This paradigm makes even more relevant an increased role for institutions that 
can act, both at domestic and international levels. It somehow questions the 
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traditional link between development cooperation and foreign policy. In fact, 
this needs to be explored in future research too.
Therefore, the growing relevance of development banks is the result of several 
factors, lying at the heart of Agenda 2030. Many countries have development 
banks, regardless of their level of income per capita. Many of these institutions 
contribute both to domestic public finance and to international public finance. 
This is the case with BNDES, Bancoldex and DBSA. This is even more relevant 
since the three banks are members of IDFC (founding member in the case of 
BNDES). Finally, in this fast-evolving landscape, development banks are critical 
for the success of the agendas aforementioned.
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